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Grand Jury the previous year and been 
discharged in January 1950 without dis-
closing the fact. Without participation in 
the verdict no prejudice resulted. 
In People v. Yeaget, 194 Cal. 45Z, 481-
48Z, ZZ9 P. 4O,it was stated that a court 
may not be required to grant a motion for 
change of venue because .,there was some 
excitement in the county regarding the mat~ 
ter, or that the press had expressed hostil-
ity; and that a denial qf a :change of venue 
might well be predicated on the fact that 
the excitement had subsided before the ap-
plication was made. In that case a mU4;:h 
shorter period had int~rvened between the 
events and the trial. In People v. Wal-
lace, 6 Cal.zd 759, 59 P.Zd 115, the chief 
of police of North Sacramento was the 
victim. The denial of the motion and the 
renewed motion and the challenge to the 
jury panel was based upon the trial court's 
fair appraisal of the jury selected about 
five weeks after the 'homicide occurred. 
87 Ca1.2d 499 
LEE ON at al. Y. LONG .t al. 
S. F. 18026. 
Supreme Court of CalJfornin, In Bank. 
June 29, 1951. 
Rehearing Denied July 26, 1051. 
Lee On and others brought action against 
James Long, indIviduallY and as sheriff, etc., 
and others to recover money seized from 
gambling tables, by the named defendant In 
a gambling raid. The action was consolidat-
ed for trial with n petition filed by the Coun-
ty of Contra Costa tor an order authorizing 
forfeitUre of tbe money to the county. The 
Superior Court of Contra Costa County, 
Homer W. Patterson, J., entered an order 
denying the county's prayer for forfeiture 
of the money and denied plaintiffs recovery, 
and the plaintiffs appealed. The Supreme 
Court, Spence, J., held that courts would not 
lend assista~ce to plaintiffs whose claim tor 
relief rests on an illegal transaction. 
Affirmed. 
As declated in those cases the matters were Carter, Shauer, and Traynor, JJ.; dis-
addressed to the soun~ discretion of the sen ted. 
trial court. Here there is no justification Prior opinion, 223 P.2d 894. 
for a conc1u9ion that the court committed 
an abuse of discretion in denying the mo- I. Action c$;:I4 
tion for a change of venue or in disallow.. Where sheriff and deputies on gam-
ing the challenge to the jury panel. bling raid SeIZed gambling paraphernalia 
The record discloses that the defendant and money from gambling tables, and the 
had a fair and impartial trial and that the money was deposited with county treasur-
evidence fully supports the verdicts of the er, and owners of gambling paraphernalia 
jury. and money pleaded guilty to gambling 
charges and were fined, court would not 
lend assistance to owners of the money in 
suit against the sheriff and others to re-
cover the money, since the. owners claim 
for - relief rested on illegal transaction. 
Pen. Code, § 330. 




C. ]., and EDMONDS, 
SCHAUER, and SPENCE, 
CAR TER, Justice. 
I dissent. 
In my opinion the ~vidence· was in-
sufficient to estabHsh the corpus: delicti, 
and the trial court committed prejudicial 
error in stating in the presence 'of the 
jury that the corpus delicti had been es-
tablished. 
I would,_ therefore, reverse the judg-
ment and remand the ca5e for a new trial. 
Rehearing denied; CARTER, J., dissent-
ing. 
234 P.2d-l~ 
2. Gaming *='58 
Where sheriff and deputies on gam-
bling raid seized gambling paraphernalia 
and money from gambling tables, and the 
money was deposited with county treasur-
er, and ownerS of gambling paraphernalia 
and money pleaded guilty to gambling 
charges and were ,fined, county was not 
entitled to have the money forfeited to 
county, notwithstanding that owners of 
money could not prevail in suit to recover 
the money. Pen. Code, § 330; Govern-
ment Code, § Z9704. 
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3. C •• tracts $=0138(1) 
A party to an illegal contract cannot 
COme into court of law and ask to have 
his illegal objects carried out, nor can he 
set up a case in which he must necessarily 
disclose an illegal purpose as the ground-
work of his claim. 
4. Contracts <!P 138(7) 
Rule that a party to an illegal con-
tract cannot come into a court of law to 
have the contract enforced, is not limited 
in its application to parties to the illegal 
transaction, as distinguished from an at-
tempt to set up a claim against a third 
party, based on the law's violation. 
5. Contracts <!P138(1) 
The test of the application of the rule 
that a party to an illegal contract cannot 
come into court of law and ask to have 
the illegal contract enforced, is whether the 
plaintiff can establish his case otherwise 
than through the medium of an illegal 
transaction to which he himself is a party. 
6. Action $=04 
If plaintiff cannot open his case, based 
on an illegal transaction, without showing 
that he has broken the law, the court will 
not assist him, whatever his claim in jus-
,tice may be on the defendant. 
7. Trover and conversion e=a16 
In an action for conversion, the plain-
tiff must recover, if at all, on the strength 
of his own title and not on the weakness 
of the title of his adversary. 
Deasy & Dodge and Philip L. Evans, 
Oakland, for appellants. 
Fred N. Howser, Atty. Gen., Clarence 
A. Linn, Deputy Atty. Gen., Francis W. 
Collins, Dist. Atty. (Contra Costa), and 
Thomas F. McBride, Deputy Dist. Atty., 
Martinez, for respondents. 
J. F. Coakley, Dis!. Atty. (Alameda), R. 
Robert Hunter, Ass!. Dist. Atty., Richard 
H. KUppert, Deputy Dis!. Atty., William E. 
Simpson, Dist. Atty. (Los Angeles), J. 
Francis O'Shea, Dist. Atty. (Sacramento), 
J. D. Keller, Dist. Atty. (San Diego), Thom-
a. C. Lynch, Dis!. Atty. (San Francisco), 
Chester Watson, Dis!. Atty. (San Joaquin), 
Louis De Matteis, Dist. Atty. (San Mat<o). 
and N. J. Menard, Dis~ Atty. (Santa Clara), 
as amici curiae on ·behalf of respondents. 
SPENCE, Justice. 
[I] The question to be determined is 
whether the trial court erred in its judg-
ment denying plaintiffs the right to recover 
money seized while in use in gambling 
games, which games were being conducted 
in violation of law. Consistent with the 
settled principle that the courts will not 
lend assistance to persons whose claim for 
relief rests on an illegal transaction, it is 
our conclusion that plaintiffs cannot pre-
vail. 
In AUg'.lst, 1945, plaintiffs were arrested 
in a gambling raid made on certain prem-
ises in El Cerrito. Thereafter plaintiffs 
were charged with the violation of section 
330 of the Penal Code (gaming); and upon 
arraignment, they pleaded guilty to the 
charges and paid the fines imposed. 
In the course of the raid, t-he sheriff 
and his deputies seized from the tables at 
which plaintiffs were seated certain dice, 
dominoes, playing cards, lottery tickets, and 
money in the amount of $6,248.35. The 
county of Contra Costa -filed a petition in 
the superior court praying for an order au-
thorizing destruction of the gambling 
paraphernalia and forfeiture of the money. 
Plaintiffs in tum brought suit against the 
sheriff, Long, and the district attorney, 
Collins, for the return of the money. The 
two cases were tried upon the same evi-
dence. The court ordered confiscation of 
the gambling paraphernalia but with re-
spect to the money, it denied both the 
county's petition for forfeiture and also 
plaintiffs' prayer for its return. 
In the disposition of plaintiffs' action, 
the trial court found, in accord with the 
undisputed testimony of the sheriff, de-
fendant Long, that the money was seized 
from gambling tahles. wher:e it was uin use 
in gambling games"; that plaintiffs had 
pleaded guilty to the violation of section 
330 of the Penal Code and each had paid a 
fine of $250; that the money had been 
deposited by defendant Long with the 
county treasurer, and that plaintiffs had 
failed to file a claim "against defendants 
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in their official capacity pur- question of whether plaintiffs, admittedly 
suant to the requirements of Section 29704 engaged in illegal gambling activities at 
of the Government Code." Upon these the time-of the raid and their arrest, are 
findings, the eourt concluded that plain- in a position to assert their ownership and 
tiffs' claim was barred "by their failure right to possession of the money that was 
to comply with said sectio~, 29704; that then in actual use. in such activities, and 
the money "at the time of' [its] seizure" to enlist the aid of the court in seeking to 
was being "used in violatibn of the [state] have it restored to them. 
gaming laws"; and that' -"the law will not [H] "No principle of law is better 
lend its support to a claim founded on its settled than that a party to an illegal COl>-
own violation." From the 'adverse judg~ tract cannot come into a court of law and 
ment accordingly entered, plaintiffs have ask to have his illegal objects carried out; 
appealed. nor can he set up a ease in which he must 
[2] The principal question on this ap- necessarily disclose an illegal purpose -as 
pe3J, the answer to which, -appears to be the groundwork of his claim." 17 C.J.S., 
determinative, is whether plaintiffs, despite Contracts, § 272, p. 656. 
their c1aim of ownership and right to pos- NQr is this established rule limited in 
session of the money in question, are never- its application to parties to the inega1 
theless barred from its, recovery by the transaction as distinguished from an at-
trial court's lfindings that: the money was tempt to set up a claim against a third 
"at the time of its seizure in use in gam- party based on the law's violation. Schur 
bling games," which games were being v. Johnson, 2 Cal.App.2d 680, 683, 38 P.2d 
conducted in violation Qf law. Plaintiffs 844; Asher v. Johnson, 26 Ca1.App.2d 403, 
do not contest the propri~ty of these find- 413,79 P.2d 457. A.was said in the Schur 
ings, but they argue that the trial court's case, 2 Cal.App.2d at pages 68~84, 38 
refusal to return the money to them is P.2d at page 846, "'the test of its [the 
contrary to the statutory provisions limit- rule's] application is whether the plaintiff 
ing the scope of forfeitures. To this point, can estaJblish his case otherwise than 
plaintiffs cite section 2604 of the Penal through the medium of an illegal trans-
Code, declaring that "No conviction of any action to which he himself is a party.''' 
person for a crime works: any forfeiture Likewise illustrative of the courts' attitude 
of any property, except in cases in which towards the enforcement of a demand 
a forfeiture is expressly ir;nposed by law". "connected with an illegal transaction" is 
The Legislature has pr6vided in two in- the statement in the Asher case, 26 Cal. 
stances for the forfeiture of money used in App.2d at page 416, 79 P.2d at page 464: 
gambling, neither of which is applicable If'If the plaintiff cannot open his case 
here: Penal Code, § 335a, having to do without showing that he has broken the 
with gambling devices other than those law, the court will not assist him, what-
here involved; and section 325, dealing ever his claim in justice may be upon the 
with lottery activities, as to which the defendant.''' In such cases, the illegal 
seized money was in nowise connected nature of the transaction creates a udis_ 
under the evidence or the court's 'findings. ability in [the] plaintiff." 17 c.J.S. Con-
Consistent with the general rule governing tracts, § 272, p. 659. 
the construction of statutes involving for- Here it is manifest that plaintiffs could 
feitures (12 CaI.Jur. § 3, pp. 633-634), the not, and did not prove their right to po,-
trial court properly recognized the limits of session of the seized money without dis-
its " express statutory authority and denied closing that it was in use in their iIIegaJ 
the county's petition for forfeiture "as far gambling activities at the time of the raid 
as the money [was] concerned." Cf. Chap- and their arrest in the gambling estabJish-
man v. Aggeler, 47 Cal.App.2d 848, ment. Moreover, plaintiffs pleaded guilty 
860-il61, 119 P.2d 204. However, the pres- to the violation of the gaming law a, 
ent case on appeal does not concern the charged fol1owing their arrest and paid 
law of forfeitures, but rather relates to the the ,fines imposed. Shall the courts then 
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lend their aid to enable persons such as 
plaintiffs, whO' have committed a criminal 
offense, to recover the money which was 
in actual use in the perpetration thereof? 
Such question must be answered in the 
negative under the principles enunciated 
in Schur v. Johnson, supra, 2 Ca1.App.2d 
680, 38 P.2d 844, and Asher v. Johnson, 
supra, 26 CaI.App.2d 403, 79 P.2d 457, 
where the operators of illegal tango es~ 
tablishments sought to' recover sales taxes 
which they paid to the state under protest 
that such levies had been improperly made 
on their gambling games. In the last cited 
cases, plaintiffs were denied recovery on 
. the ground that they had to rely on their 
unlawful business to' establish their right 
to recover the money wrongfully collected. 
In so holding, the court in the Asher case 
pertinently said, 26 Cal.App.2d at page 408, 
79 P.2d at page 460: "We cauuot afford to 
temporize on principles which vitally affect 
the public welfare." As involving funda-
mentally similar legal considerations, the 
court there cited and quoted at length 
26 Cal.App.2d 41(}.411, 79 P.2d 457, from 
the leading case of Dorrell v. Clark, 90 
Mont 585, 4 P.2d 712, 79 A.LR 1000, 
holding that the owner o,r possessor of a 
slot machine, which is lawfully seized by 
a ~heriff or a police officer, is not entitled 
to the return of the money found therein. 
''(he same general reasoning has been fol-
','Owed by courts in other jUJfisdictions in 
refusing to restore to alleged owners money 
earmarked or segregated as part of gam-
bling operations and lawfully seized along 
with gambling paraphernalia in the COurse 
of a gambling raid. Hofferman v. Sim-
mons, 290 N.Y. 449, 49 N.E.2d 523, 527; 
Germania Club v. City of Chicago. 332 Ill. 
App. 112, 74 N.E.2d 29, 30; State v. Mc-
Nichols, 63 Idaho 100, 117 P.2d 468, 
469-470; State v. Johnson, 52 N.M. 229. 
195 P.2d 1017, 1020; see, also, Fairmount 
Engine Co. v. Montgomery Co., 135 Pa. 
Super. 367,5 A.2d 419, 42(}.421; Krug 
v. Board of Chosen Freeholders, 3 N.J. 
Super. 22, 65 A.2d 542, 544. 
[7] Equally applicable here as in the 
Asher case is the fundamental legal prin-
ciple of the Dorrell decision in precluding 
plaintiffs, "admitting the violation of the 
law," which they must disclose as ff 'the 
groundwork of [their] claim''', from re-
covery of the money which was in actual 
use in their illegal gambling activities. 
Dorrell v. Clark, supra, 90 Mont. 585, 4 
P.2d 712, 714. It is not a question of the 
ultimate disposition of the seized money, 
but rather application of a "salutary rule 
invoked to uphold law and order." Asher 
v. Johnson, supra, 26 Cal.App.2d 403, 414, 
79 P.2d 462. This principle of the law, 
grounded on public POliCY, is not affected 
by the independent considerations entering 
into the statutory declaration limiting for-
feitures to those "expressly imposed by 
law". (Pen. Code, § 2604.) As pointed out 
in the Dorrell ca'se, 4 P.2d 713, in an action 
for conversion, the "plaintiff must recover, 
if at all, upon the strength of his own title 
and not upon the weakness of his adversary 
'" • •. n (See, also, 22 Ca1.Jur. § 42. 
p. 167.) Under these circumstances, the 
trial court did not undertake to declare a 
forfeiture hut properly held that plaintiffs 
were not entitled to prevail in their suit 
for recovery of the seized gambling funds. 
See Dorrell v. Clark, supra, 90 Mont. 585, 
4 P.2d 712, 714. 
In view of the conclusion reached on 
the question heretofore discussed, it is 
unnecessary to determine whether plain-
tiffs would be barred in any event because 
of their failure to present a claim in the 
manner provided in section 29704 of the 
Government Code (formerly Pol. Code, § 
4075). 
The judgment is affirmed. 
GIBSON, C. J., and SHENK and ED-
MONDS, JJ., concurred. 
CARTER, Justice. 
I dissent, 
The majority opinion holds, contrary to 
the statutes, that a person convicted of 
gambling (Pen. Code. § 330) may be .ub-
j ected to two penalties, fine or imprison-
ment and the loss of the money that was 
used in the gambling enterprise and selLed 
by the arresting officers. It arrives at that 
astonishing conclusion by equally astonish-
ing reasoning. It concedes that the state 
could no/ dccla1'e a forfeiture of the me .... 
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ey-that it is oot ~contraband. Yet It con- ery of the money seized, puts itself above 
eludes that if the state does seize it and the law and "works" a forfeiture. This i 
is unlawfuUy holding it, the Owners can- section has been ·applied as not defeating 
not recover it. If the result of that COD- an action to protect a homestead on pro~ 
elusion is not confiscation or forfeiture, erty used for prostitution. In Harlan v. 
then the law is indeed an "ass," for it for- Schulze, 7 Cal.App. 287, 294-295, 94 P. 
sakes logic and reason for sophistry-a 379, 382, the court stated: -"If residing 
mere play on words resulting in a legal in a house of prostitution is a crime, as· 
paradox-the -state cannot acquire title- suggested by respondent in view of sec-
the owner cannot recover possession from tion 315 of the Penal Code, we must not 
the state. overlook section 677 [the predecessor of 
The majority announces the broad rule § 2604] of the same Code, which declares: 
that where any property is used in the 'No conviction of any person for crime 
commission of any unlawful act and the works any forfeiture of any property, ex-
officers seize it while making an arrest cept in cases in which a forfeiture is ex-
(I assume it was lawfully seized and cauld pressly imposed by law; and all forfeitures 
be held a. evidence for the trial), then the to the people of this state, in the nature 
state may retain it although it cannot de- of a'deodand, or where any person shall 
clare it forfeited. The implications of flee from justice, are abolished!" In 
that rule are far reaching and inimical to Chapman v. Aggeler, 47 Cal,App.2d 848, 
our concept of justice. It may even go 119 P.2d 204, the owner of slot machines 
so far that an! time a traffic officer has the seized by the police ina raid, brought an 
notion, he may seize a car which he claims action to recover them. Losing in' the 
is being used in violation of any of the. trial court, the owner appealed. The ap-
innumerable traffic laws. A pernnent iI- pellate court reversed and directed the trial 
lustration is suggested by what is done court to order return of the machines. The 
under the ordinances which authorize the court proceeded in part on the ground that 
towing away o.f cars when parked in pro- there was no dinding that the machines 
hibited areas. If the city should decide were used for gambling, but .u.o, said 
that it would like to use those cars for 47 CaI.App.Zd at pages 860-&51, 119 P.2d 
carrying on its business, it may do so, Ac- at page 210: "We first call attention to 
cording to the majority opinion they could the fact that this appellant was convicted 
not be confiscated but the owners could of no crime, and then cite the restrictive 
not recover them from the city. The same rule which obtains even when a defendant 
would be true of a horse run in an illegal is found guilty. It is found in section 677 
race. of the Penal Code providing that 'No con-
The statutes in this state leave no room viction of any person for crime works any . 
forfeiture of any property, except in cases for doubt that property used in the com-
mission of an unlawful act cannot be con- in _,which a forfeiture is expressly imposed 
discated by the state unless the statute by I~w', In all of chapter X of the Penal 
e",pressly so provides. It .is conceded by ~ Code, \\,:hich is entitled 'Gaming', and where 
the majority that there is no statute au- .ection!~30a appears, there was, prior to 
thorizing or permitting the forfeiture of this lear, no provision for forfeitur~ This 
money used in a gambling 'fame. The can hardly be considered accidental since 
Penal Code provides: "No conviction of the p'receding chapter dealing with lotterie. 
any person for a crime works any forfei- cont.in$ '8 provision for forfeiture in sec .. 
ture of any properly, except in cases in tion -325,' an instance where forfeiture is 
which a forfeiture i. e",pressly imposed by 'expressly imposed by law'. But even 
law; * • _.n (Pen. Code, § 2604.) there, in order to make forfeiture effec-
(Italics added.) A conviction of gambling tive, an action must be brought or an in-
cannot, therefore, "work" a forfeiture; formation filed 'by the attorney-general, or 
that is, the law cannot "work" a forfeiture. by any district attorney, in the name of 
But this court, by refusing to allow recov- the state'. And by this procedure no 
______________ I!filll-~~2~ _________ • __ -~,iiOI;,E>N.,~" ____________ _ 
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lottery or gambling machine may be taken 
by the state, but only the cmoneys and 
property, oftered for sale or distribution 
* * *'. * • * In short, there is no 
statute in California that has been called to 
our attention or that we have been able to 
'find that vests in the court authority to 
declare a forfeiture in a case such as we 
afe considering. In the absence of express 
statutory authority, the order requiring the 
destruction of the property in question_ is 
without legal sanction and void. 
"It follows from this that the portion of 
the judgment, by which the court ordered 
the seized property to be destroyed and a-
record entry made of its destruction, can· 
not be sustained. 
"Judgment reversed, without costs to 
either party, and the cause remanded with 
instructions that judgment be entered for 
plaintiff entitling him to tlte return, forth-
with of the seized property." (Italics 
added.) That case stands, therefore, for 
the proposition that if property, seized 
while being used unlawfully, may not be 
confiscated by the state, the owner may 
recover it. 
Furthermore, it should be observed that 
the Legislature has provided that the 
maximum penalty for the violation of sec-
tion 330 of the Penal Code, of which plain-
tiffs were convicted, is a $500 fine. (Pen. 
Code, § -330.) Yet this court, by refusing 
to allow recovery of the money, levies a 
,fine of over $6,000. 
It has been held that the owner may 
recover money when it is used in gaming 
and seized by the state where there is no 
statute providing for a forfeiture. Chap-
pen v. Stapleton, 58 Ga.App. 138, 198 S.E. 
109; Kearney v. Webb, 278 Ill. 17, 115 
N.E. 844, 3 A.L.R. 1631; 23 Minn.L.Rev. 
976. Schur v. Johnson, 2 Ca1.App.2d 
680, 38 P.2d 844 and Asher v. Johnson, 26 
Ca1.App.2d 403, 79 P.2d 457, relied upon 
by the majority are not in point, for they 
did not involve or consider the lack of 
right in the state to declare a forfeiture 
unless expressly authorized by statute. 
(Pen. Code, § 2604, supra.) Moreover 
those cases ignored the rule, later dis-
cussed, that a stranger to the gambling 
game-the state here-cannot rely upon 
the illegality of the use being made of the 
money. 
The majority opinion rests its conclusion 
in part upon the proposition that a third 
party, the state here, may raise the claim 
of the illegality of the transaction between 
the participants in the game and cite Schur 
v. Johnson, supra, and Asher v. Johnson, 
supra. That is not the law in California 
or elsewhere. For illustration, it is said 
in Kyne v. Kyne, 16 Ca1.2d 436, 440, 106 
P.2d 620, 622: "For example, a bank will 
not be permitted to invoke the illegality of 
a contract between two individuals and 
thereby retain money which was the fruit 
of the illegal transaction and which was 
deposited by one of them for the account 
of the other." (See cases collected SO 
A.L.R. 293.) Here, the state was not a 
party to the unlawful game and it can 
make no claim to the money through the 
participants. It is in no different position 
than a thief who seized the money from 
the table, and, as said in 29 California 
Law Review 422, in commenting on the 
Schur and Asher cases, supra: "It is diffi-
cult to see how the state's wrongful col-
lection of taxes can in any way be said 
to make the state claim through the tango 
proprietors. The state would be just as 
much a stranger to the illegal business as 
would a thief, or as was the bank in the 
case put by the court, supra, note 18. The 
court's refusal to aid the parties to recOver 
their money seems to be no more than a 
judicially created and imvosed pena1ty for 
carrying on the unlawful business." A'E 
we have seen, the Legislature has ,fixed the 
penalty for gambling, and stated that there 
could be no forfeiture. This court, theTe-
fore, has no authority to increase it or 
impose a forfeiture. To do so is to usurp 
the power of the Legislature in viDlation 
of the Constitution (art. III, § 1). 
Closely related to the last discusseu 
proposition is the majority's conclusion 
that plaintiffs could not recover if they 
had to rely upon the illegal gambling trans-
action to prevail. ,It is conceded that if 
they do not so have to place their reliance 
on such transaction they may prevail, and 
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that is the law. Guerin v. Kirst, 33 Cal.2d it follows that the state may and will ap-
402, 410, 202 P.2d 10, 7 AL.R2d 922. All propriate it to its own use with impunity 
they would need to ~show -is that it was and a forfeiture is effected in violation of 
their money that was .00 the table and the the express statutory provision to the con-
sheriff seized it and that he or one of the trary-another legal paradox. 
defendants stilI retains it. For what pur- I would therefore reverse the judgment. 
pose the money was t~e.re or what use was 
being made of it would be wholly im- SCHAUER, Justice (dissenting). 
material. It is no different than the illus- I concur ,in the conclusion reached by 
tration given in K)'lie Y. Kyne, 16 Cal.2d Justice Carter. This is not a case in 
436, 440, 106 P.2d 620, supra, of the bank which relief tenably can be denied upon 
hOlding funds involvecf ~in an illegal trans- the ground that title is daimed through 
action in which it ~~ ~ot: a participant. an iJIegal transaction. The claimants' title 
The majority opinion speaks of public here does not appear to have been derived 
policy as the basis for its conclusion. The. from gaming; -c on the contrary, it ',is as-
question arises: Who -is supreme in that serted and proved .to exist entirely inde-
field, the Legislature ·or the courts? The pendent of the gaining. . 
Legislature, by faiIi1>g to provide for a The action of this court does not strike 
forfeiture, and furth~r ,stating, that when down but, rather, puts a premium on law-
it does not so provide, there shall be none lessness. It accomplishes that which could 
(Pen. Code, § 2604, supra), has unequivo- properly be ordained, if at all, only on a 
cally announced the:. policy that persons forfeiture statute clear and unmistakable 
engaged ingambling shall not be penalized in terms. There is no· such statute; the 
by losing the money, used.; The majority decisioD,'therefore, invades the province of 
opinion tluUifies this Policy; for it will not the Legislature. 
permit the owners of "the mpney to recover The mischievo~s r~sult$ whiCh may fot~ 
it. To say that that does not _amount to a low are legion. Among other thin~ it 
forfeiture is to deny ~the obvi'ous. It can- purports .to give judicial protection to hi~ 
not be denied that by ~uch a holding the jacking. Anyone may appropriate any ob-
owners lose their property. The state has ject used directly or indirectly in an unlaw-
it and intends to keep" it. It cannot obtain £ul activity., A. hostess entertaining at 
title to it .by forfeit.u~. prQceedings, but no bridge or gin rummy or simila.r diversion 
doubt it will eventuaH), make use of it. may well find her furniture (card tables, 
It cannot be left in IilnqQ. It was said by chairs, etc.) appropriated and removed from 
Judge.Augustus N. Hand, that recovery of her premises; she cannot recover them. A 
property involved in r~ illegal transaction player may find his eyeglasses taken from· 
will nol be barred "w~e~~ the res sought to him; he cannot recover them. It could not 
be recovered is held ill ~scrow under what be burglary to unvitedly arid 'Surrel?titiously 
is in effect an order of interpleader so that enter a private home for the purpose of 
a refusal to act in favor of the complainant appropriating such abjects. 
will amount to affirmative action in favor 
of the other party." I Judson v. Buckley; 
Z Cir., 130 F.2d 174, 180 .. That. is precisely 
the situation here. (rhe state does not 
have title and cannot" have it declared 
forfeited.. It thus has mere possession, 
such as in escrow, aftd'to. deny recovery 
bY the owners amounts :to an Uaffinnative 
action in favor" of the 'state, that is, for ... 
feiture. No one can prevent the state from 
using it a.s the otlly .. ,tereslea parlies are 
the O'WtIers and they can do nothing. Hence 
All of this is enacted by this court to no 
worthy end. The holding ·will not have 
the slightest deterrent effect on organized 
or professional gambling; it can be used 
to embarrass and injure inoffensive and 
substantial citizens in their homes. 
The judgment should be reversed. 
TRAYNOR, Justice (dissenting). 
I concur in the conclusion reached by 
Justices CARTER and SCHAUER 
